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PlantClosings, Labor Demand and theValueof the Firm
ABSTRI\CT
Thisstudy postulates an internal labor market in which workers accumulate firm—
specific human capital that raises the value of the firm and insulates it to some extent
from the vagaries of product demand that might result in Its closing. Negative product—
market shocks reduce wage growth and increase the probability of the firm closing. The
model also predicts a U—shaped relation between the probability of the plant closing and
the length of a worker's tenure, a proxy for firm—specific human investment.
PSID data for 1977 through 1981 are used to produce weighted—probit estimates of the
parameters of an equation describing the probability of displacement. The results support
most of the predictions of the model, but similarly specified equations describing the
probability of permanent layoff indicate that a theory of plant closings must differ from
that of layoffs. The parameter estimates are used to infer an analogue to the firm's
elasticity of demand for labor and to deduce the wage reduction necessary to avoid an




East Lansing, MI 48824
(517) 332—3448More Workers Resist Employers' Demands for Pay Concessions.
Unions Say Past Givebacks Haven't Saved Any Jobs, See a Ploy to
Trim Wages; but Firms Do Close Plants.1
I.Introduction
With the introduction of the notion of implicit contracts between workers
and employers by Azariadis (1975) and Gaily (1974) there has come a host of
variants on the basic theme of long—term employment relationships. <See
Rosen, 1985, 4or a survey of many of these.) This burgeoning of theoretical
work has not been matched, however, by a growth in the use of the basic
concept to study empirical aspects of labor—market behavior in new ways.
Other than a few studies (e.g., Lazear, 1979, and Raisian, 1983) that have
used the theory to motivate specific empirical results, its main application
has been to make economists more aware of the importance of long—term
employment relations in labor markets.
In this study a contracting approach is used to examine the relationships
between firms whose own survival is uncertain and their workers. Workers are
viewed as contracting with their employers for a package that includes a
probability that the job will exist and an increment in wages above the
entry—level wage. They are considered tied to the employer by a wedge between
their wage in the firm and the wage ty could obtain elsewhere. Using
standard assumptions about workers'risk aversion,and a somewhat novel way e
specifyingemployers' profit functions, I analyze the nature of equilibrium
combinations of observed risks (of the job disappearing) and changes in
returns to these tenured workers. In addition to examining this relationship
the study provides information on what happens to firms before they close, and
thus implicitly gives evidence on the dynamics of decl ining industries.The empirical estimates provide a way of inferring parameters de;cribric
employment relations that could not otherwise be measured, or could not be
riitsured o ppvupi y .
elasticities, but very few are based on rnlcroeconomic data. As Harnermesh
(1986) shows, the use of agQregated data on both the price and quantity of
labor induces an inherent simultaneity in these estimates. By inferrinQ
elasticities from rnicroeconomc data, this study may provide more precision
than has heretofore been possible. The model also allows one to infer the
size of wage concessions that workers must offer to keep plants from closing.
Since plant closings and concessionary waQe bargaining have received
increasing attention in the U.S. and where in the past decade, this
additional focus can provide a guide to the relationship between these two
phenomena
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11.Contractingand the Risk of Displacement
In this Section 1 derive the equil ibrium relationship between the wage
rate received by homogeneous workers and the probability that their jobs will
disappear because their employer closes the business. When workers sort
themselves among firms, one of the risks they consider is that the Job will
disappear due to exogenous negative shocks. As with any other such risk, we
may assume that the combination of workers' risk aversion and employers'
production technologies results in a positive relationship between the
observed probabil ity that a plant will close and the wage rate.3 Workers thus
enter firms at a reservation wage W" that makes them indifferent between
choosing between that firm and at least one other. The market produces a
compensating differential in the reservation wage at different firms that is
positively related to the ex ante expected probability that the firm willclose. This reservation wage, including the compensating differential for the
firm—specific expected risk of closing, isthebasis against which workers
compare the wages they receive once they have joined the firm.
L4orkers who enter the firm acquire firm—specific human capital that
raises their wage rates above what they could obtain elsewhere, other things,
including the expected risk of displacement, equal. Assume for the moment
that such training is instantaneous, so that all workers who have joined the
firm are identical.I assume that the firm employing such workers faces a
known distribution of random prices P, h(P,S), where P)O and S is an index of
demand. S may be viewed as an exogenous demand shock to markets in which the
firm sells, with a higher S shifting the distribution of prices to the right
(so that S can be viewed as a positive shock to the market in which the firm
sells).I assume the capital stock is fixed at K* and write the firm's
profits as:
IPX —L4L—rK*
where production is characterized by X =F<L,K*),W is the wage rate, and r is
the cost of capital services.
I assume that wages are set by the firm and its workers at the start of
each time period in full knowledge of the state of product—market shocks, as
indexed by a particular value of 5, say S*. The firm then draws from the
distribution h(P,S*) and decides whether or not to shut down. Let 1* be the
critical level of profits that determines the firms continued existence.
Above this level the firm will stay in business; below it, the firm will
close. Then at this level of profits the product price must be:
(1) P* =[1*+WL+rK*]/XThis means that the probabil it>' the -firmwillclose, p, is:
(2) p
p= f h(P,S)dP
Equation 2: impiicitly defines a relationship between p and 1J for a
givenset o-f exogenous conditions determining S. This relationship can be
viewed as the set of probabil ities that the firm remains in business
consistent with each particular wage rate at a given 3*. The probabil it>'
depends on the distribution of stochastic prices, a distribution that is





Now dP*./dW can be rewritten as:
(4) dP*/dlJ =El+'fl—
I1FLP*/W]EL/X),
where 'isthe total demand elasticity for labor. So long as workers are not
paid in excess of their marginal revenue products, we can be sure from (3)
that dP*/dt.J>O, and thus that dp/dJ:9:o. The probabilistic shut—down
frontier for 5=3* is shown in Figure 1. It shows the set of all points along
which probabil istic profits are at the competitive minimum given values of U
and the state of the market S. Viewed differently, it shows the probabil it>' of
plant closing at each wage. Favorable shocks shift the frontier to the right,
unfavorable ones to the left. (In order to present both sides of the internal
labor market, the frontier is drawn with as the origin.)
The typical person attached to the firm is assumed to choose between a
higher wage and a reduced risk that the firm will close. Hours of work are













































































































 and an uncertain probability of the job disappearinQ because the plant
closes.I define workers! expected utility once they have taken a job with a
particular -firm(andacquired firm—specific traininq) intermsof the excess
over t.hat they could obtain outside the -firm. The typical workers
expected utility increment -from remaining in the firm is thus:
(5) V =E1—p]U(IA—Ii)+ pU(O), u'>O, U1'<O
Obviously, i-fWfalls below what can be obtained elsewhere, the worker will
leave the firm voluntarily. We are thus implicitly examininq changes in W and
p only within some 1 imnited range. Beyond that range the worker will break the
contract with the employer.




=E1 —p ] U' /U > o.
Because of the assumptions about U the indifference map between p and W
contains curves that are concave to the origin.4 Typical indifference curves
V0 and V1 are shown in Figure 1. Combinations 0-f wage rates arid risks o-f plant
closing along iJ0 are preferred to those along V1, -for at each wage rate along
the former the risk of losing the Job is lower.
Equilibrium in the internal labor market is defined by the tangency of
the indifference curve to the probabil istic shut—down frontier for fixed 6*,
i.e., where:
(7) (dp/dW)55 =(dp/dW)HR*
The presence of firm—specific investment insulates the average worker to some
extent from random shocks to product demand; for that reason the equil ibrium
-5-is drawn for the average set of exogenous conditions, 9*, at point A in the
first quadrant o-fFigure1. A shock to this equilibrium, for example, a
yat i ye shock that lowers S to S** such that the probability mass of h is
shifted to the left, produces a new equilibrium on the new shut—down frontier
S**S** in Firure 1. Without specific assumptions about the shape of the
zero—profit frontier, one cannot define the slope of EE', the locus of
equil ibriurn combinations (p,W). However, as I show in the next Section, under
very reasonable assumptions the loc.'.s the negative slope shown in Figure
The discussion has dealt with the contractual relationship between a
worker and an employer in a firm whose continued existen 'isuncertain.It
deals with a distinctly nonmarginal event——the demise of a plant or firm. It
is designed to explain, using the mechanism of a minimum required rate of
profit and workers' attitudes toward risk, why some plants or firms shut down
rather than make marginal changes that, with a neoclassical technology !d
individualized setting of wages, would allow the plant or firm to continue in
e 5tence.
The analysis applies to the discussion of plant closings and not to
permanent layoffs from continuing enterprises. ie the employers' side
could be applied mutatis rnutandis to analyze layoffs, changing the worker's
side appropriately would require specifying a util ity map that includes both
workers' beliefs about their own probabil ities of being subject to layoff
should S decrease and a mechanism for ordering layoffs.See Wright, 1985,
for an analysis that embodies such a mechanism.) Without these changes the
model as presented in this section is not likely to go far in explaining
layoff behavior.
III. Estimating Equations and Data
-6-To move fromtheset of equil ibriumpointsdefined by (7) under various
values0+ to an equation that allows inferences to be drawn about the shape
of the locus of equil ibria one needs to specify the forms of the utility and
production functions. Inthecase of the former, let:
U =
astandard form, where isameasure of relative risk aversion. Then from
6)
(8) (dp/dWvv=El_P][l]/LW_Wr)
On the firm's side, very little can be concluded about the convexity or
concavity of the zero—profit frontier without making very restrictive
assumptions about the density function h(P,S). Being unwilling to make these
assumptions about the distribution of prices, I instead assume a linear
approximation to (3) and let:
(9) (dp/dW36 =y.
Throughout the discussion thus far I have assumed labor is homogeneous in
production when it rters the firm and is then instantaneously trained. This
assumption ignores the likelihood that the shared investment in firm—specific
human capital that generates a wedge between workers' productivity and their
wage is made over a long period of time. Assume, therefore, that effective
units of labor, L', are related to nominal units, L, by:
L' =LGTN),where G(TN:1, o'>o,o"<o
followingtheevidence that the amount of firm—specific human capital embodied
in workers increases at a decreasing rate with their tenure, TN, in the firm
—(e.g., Nhncer—Jovanovic, 1981). The training adds more to workers-'
productivity than it does to their wages, and the difference widens over much
of the range of TN.Thenthe slope in (3) and <4) can be rewritten as:
(dP/dW)ss* =c(TN)h(p,S')
Equation <9) then becomes:
(9') (dp/d14) =(TN) 5=s*
Theempirical counterpart to the equil ibriurn condition (7) is thus
(10)p =--- G(TN)E_WrJ+1
The estimating equation linearizes (10) assumes that there are some
variables Z that determine(are indicators of the degree of workers'
relative risk aversion:) and writes wages in logarithms.5 Because workers'
initial choices among firms were based an the expected risk of displacement,
the reservation wage too will be positively related to the probabil it>' of
displacement and should be included in the equation.UJ1' is therefore added to
(10-') to reflect the compensating wage differential that should exist between
the ex ante risk of plant closing and the returns to otherwise identical
workers. The basic estimating equation is thus:
(10')p =a0
—
a1[mW — + a21r —
a3G(TN)+
a4H(Z)
If the hypotheses put forth here are correct: 1:) The term in ElnL4 —1nt411
will have an inverse relation to p. Shocks to the distribution of prices will
cause the internal labor market to trace out a locus of temporary equilibria
like that shown in Figure 1. 2:)quadratic in tenure will have alternating
negative and positive coefficients. This results from the extra value added
to the firm's net worth by the firm—specific human capital that is indicated
—8--b::i creater worker tenure, an increment whose valuediminisheswith additional
tenure. 3) Any variable in Z that indicates Qreater relative risk aversion b>'
workers will have a negative ef-fect on p.
The data used to estimate (10.) come -from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics. The file of household heads was searched to find all those who
reported that they had left their previous jobs some time in 1977—81 because
the plant shut down (displaced workers) or because they were laid off
permanently (laid—off workers). The P510 is unique among major data sets in
distinguishing between these two types of involuntary job—leavers1 a
distinction that is crucial in estimating the model derived above. The
restriction that data on all the required variables be available left samples
o-f 114 displaced workers and 203 permanent layoffs. Data on 2533 household
heads who were not displaced or permanently laid off during this five—year
period were also added to the working data file.
This file was selected to increase the number of households who
experienced the uncommon event——job displacement——above the population
percentage. 4hile the choice—based sampling procedure does reduce the
randomness associated with the sample statistics calculated on the displaced
and laid—off subsarnples separately1 it also results in probit estimation of
(10') yielding a biased constant term and biased standard errors.
Accordingly, I estimate (10') using the weighted exogenous sampl ing maximum
likelihood estimator (WESML) of Manski—Lerrnan (1977). The weight on each
observation is the ratio of its population percentage (based on data for
all household heads in the P310) to its frequency in the sample. Given the
sampling scheme I have used, the ESML estimates of <10') weight the
observations on displaced and laid—off workers less heavily than those ü
non—separatedworkers.
—9—For each involuntarily separated worker denote by T the year the person
was reported as separated. Then T is a dichotomous variable indicating
whether or not the worker was displaced (laid—off in some of the estimates)
between years T—1 and T. The data are available both for hourly—paid workers
and for salaried workers. The wage rate immediately before involuntary
separation, denoted by 'T—1' is used to represent the worker's wage. To
represent 1jrnote that even the random components of workers' wages on their
most recent jobs affect their search behavior (Kiefer—Neumann 1979);
Feldstein—Poterba, 1984). That being the case, r is measured as the worker's
wage at time T—2, minus an adjustment equal to the wage effect of the worker's
tenure with the firm.6 Years of tenure with the employer measure TN. Because
data on wages at T—1 and T—2 are required, the sample is restricted to workers
who have been with the firm for at least one year at the time of
displacement. Since the underlying theory is based on contracting, and since
workers with less than one year of tenure are less likely to have established
a contractual relationship with the employer, the necessity of restricting the
sample in order to observe two years' wages causes no problems.
It is difficult to determine what variables to include in the vector Z,
as there has been little empirical work establishing the correlates of risk
aversion in the labor market. Partly following Thaler—Rosen (19Th) I include
years of education (EDUC), and dummy variables for union membership (UNION)
and race (BLACK) in 2. Presumably, ignoring issues of selection, more
schooling reduces risk aversion, while membership in a union or in a minority
group increases it. Clearly, however, these are merely expectations based on
casual observation and are not in any sense derivable.
Data on industry—specific output shocks are available, but do not belong
in (10'): Such shocks are what move workers and firms along the equil ibrium
—10—locus EE' ; they do not shift the locus. These data were collected, though riot
included in the probits, to examine whether negative shocks are associated
with le-ftward movements along the locus. The particular data used to measure
lagged percentage changes in output between T—1 and T—2, arid T—2 and T—3,
T—1 arid T—2' are series on output in the two—digit industry in which the
household head worked at time T—1.
IV. Estimates of the Locus of Equilibria
Before examining the shape of the locus EE' ,letus compare the
characteristics of displaced workers to those of other workers. Table I shows
statistics describing the subsarnples, with the data weighted to reflect the
fractions of all household heads in each category during the live years,
1977—1981. As Table 1 clearly indicates, displaced workers on average received
significantly smaller wage increases the year before their plants closed than
did other workers. This simple difference in means suggests that the
equil ibriurn locus does have the expected negative slope.
Aside from these differences, however, the two groups differ in only
three respects 1The displaced workers suffer a sharp decl me in weeks
worked during the calendar year before they report having been displaced.
This decline is not accompanied by any measured decline in the intensity of
work: Hours stay roughly constant for this group of workers. The deci me may
thus be an artifact of the timing of interviews, insofar as some workers were
displaced well before the end of the previous year and reported reduced weeks
at work during that year.In any case, it is noteworthy that their weeks
worked were essentially the same as those of other workers two years before
displacement. 2) The average educational attainment of displaced workers is
significantly below that of other workers. 3) Output changes in the













JKST_l 42.37 46.87 40.68
(1.14) (.25) (1.16)
WKST_2 47.11 47.12 49.05
(.77) (.24) (.94)
HRST_l 43.98 42.75 43.42
(1.05) (.27) (.85)
HRST_2 43.72 42.89 44.49
(.92) (.27) (.47)
TNT_i 7.84 8.02 4.59
(.82) (.16) (.29)
UNION .291 .331 .332
(.04) (.01) (.03)
BLACK .367 .320 .589
(.05) (.01) (.04)
EDUC 11.03 11.96 11.63
(.30) (.08) (.27)
A? 3.43 4.34 2.48
T-1
(.59) (.11) (.50)






Manufacturing .418 .349 .375
(.05) (.01) (.03)
Number in Sample 114 2522 203industries in which displaced workers were employed were below those in the
industries where the sample of non—separated orker held jobs, implying that
shocks to output did move workers and firms leftward along an EE'locus. Inall
other respects, particularly in years of tenure withtheemployer, workers
whose plants close are not significantly different from those who are riot
separated involuntarily/
It is interesting to note that displaced workers as a group differ in
severalimportant respects from workers who are laid—off permanently (on whom
data are shown in the third column of Table 1). Unl ike displaced workers,
employees who were permanently laid off received wage increases during the
year before layoff that did not differ significantly from those received by
other workers. Also, and not surprisingly, given the prevalence of seniority
rules even in nonunion workplaces (see Abraham—Medof-f, 1984), the average
tenure of permanent layoffs is significantly below that of other workers,
including displaced workers.8 Also, laid-off workers had significantly higher
wage rates than non—separated workers. These considerations corroborate our
expectation in Section II that the process that induces permanent layoffs is
basically different from that which engenders the wage—employment outcomes
observed before and during plant closings.
Equation (10') is estimated over the 2636 displaced and non—separated
workers using weighted probit (WESML) analysis, with the results for the
complete specification, and for selected modifications of (10), presented for
displaced workers in Table 2. The standard errors that are used to compute
t—statistics werecalculatedusing the matrices suggested byManski—Lerman
(1977).The simple bivariate probit of the probabil ity of displacement on the
previous period's percentage wage change shows that shocks that increase the
probabil ity of displacement also significantly reduce the wage increase. The
—12—a Table 2. Probit Analysis of the Probability of Displacement
(N =2636)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant —1.916 —1.833 —.528 —.744
(—26.36) (—15.02) (—.69) (—.97)
ln(WT_l)_ln(Wr 2 —.587 —.579 —.701 —.629 T—
(—1.74) (—3.85) (—3.58) (—5.56)
TNT_i —.0246 —.0230 —.0289
(—1.04) (—0.96) (—1.20)











in L —465.06 —463.52 —459.79 —456.77
a The effect of a unit increase in a particular variable onp is its coefficient estimate
times .0539.lope of this relatiu ip isfairlysmall, —.034: Each one—percent drop in
real wage Qrowth is associated with an increase in the probabil it>' of the
plant closing of .00034. Since the mean probability of plant closinQ is .023,
a ore—percent wage decrease is associated with a 1.5 percent increase in the
probabil itytheplant closes. This suggests that, while the absolute effect
on the probability of closing is small, so Hi most of the impact of a shock
is taken up by reductions in wage growth, the relative effect is fairly
substantial.
When quadratic terms in tenure are added to the basic bivariate probit,
the results (in column (2)) provide some confirmation of the idea that the
firm shares ownership in an asset that adds more to outi! than to costs.
There is a U—shaped response of the probability that the worker will be
displaced (that a plant closes) to increases in workers' tenure. Since the
theory of investment in on—the—job training suggests that the stock of this
type of training increases at a decreasing rate with tenure, and since I
viewed firm—specific training as augmenting the value of raw labor, I expected
these effects on the probabil it>' of displacement. At the mean of tenure in
the sample of 2636 displaced and non—separated workers, the marginal effect of
a year of tenure on the probabil it>' the plant closes is —.00878. Though its
absolute effect is quite small, relative to the mean probability of
displacement additional firm—specific experience substantially reduces the
probabil ity that the firm will close. The embodiment o-f additional
firm—specific human capital in its work force partly insulates the firm from
product—market shocks.
Although the results on tenure are not very significant, it is worth
thinking about what they imply about the nature of relationships between firms
and workers. It is impossible to infer from the wage—tenure relationships in
—13—standard earnings equations whether the results reflect firm—specific
investment, learning without investment, or payment by seniority to provide
incentives riot to shirk. While the admittedly weak results on the effects of
tenure in Table 2 do not permit one to distinguish between the first two
explanations, it is difficult to concoct an explanation for them based on
incentives to avoid shirking. Indeed, since the difference between wages and
productivity rises with tenure in models of shirking, the value of the firm
will fall as average tenure increases, other things equal. This means that we
would observe firms with a work force with greater tenure being more liable to
close when faced with a negative demand shock. Obviously, one piece of
empirical work hardly provides a definitive test of two hypotheses that have
hitherto been observationally indistinguishable. However, the results do
point the way toward further tests, and do indicate the tendency of some
preliminary evidence.
The estimates in columns (3: and (4) reflect the inclusion of it4r and of
terms designed to capture proxies for workers' preferences toward risk. The
results in column 4 contain the full specification in equation (10'). The
derivation in Section III indicated that characteristics that might be
expected to proxy a higher degree of relative risk aversion will have a
negative effect on the probabil ity of displacement, other things equal. Only
one of the three estimated parameters is significantly different from zero
aad its sign is unexpected), but the other two, those on union status and
race, have the expected negative signs. Perhaps the best conclusion from
these disappointing results is that it is difficult to find readily available
empirical proxies for attitudes toward risk. Unexplained heterogeneity is all
one can identify as causing differences among workers in how they respond to
shocks to product demand among otherwise identical firms.
-14—Contrary to the derivation, ther-e isasignificant negative effect of a
worker's market wage rate or the probabil ity that the plant will close.
Apparently, as is commoninthe literature on compensating wage differentials
(e.g., Brown, 1980), the trade—off between security arid the wage rate is more
than offset by the income effect of higher earnings on the demand -for
security. From this point of view it is not surprising, since the variables I
have modelled as reflecting tastes can also be viewed as reflecting market
opportunities, that the negative effect of lnWr becomes much smaller and less
significant once the vector of three variables is added.9
Summarizing the results as a whole, a number of the factors discussed in
Section II do have the expected effects on the probability of a plant
closing. None of the effects is very large in absolute terms. Relative to
the underlying chance that a worker will be displaced, though, they are quite
substantial.
That the predictions of the derivations of Section II apply only when one
can assume that there is an identifiable locus of equilibria between workers'
preferences and -firms-' probabilistic shut—down -frontiers is suggested by an
examination of the same weighted probits estimated -for the probability of
permanent layo <shown in Table 3. The sample consists of the 203 laid—off
workers and the same group of non—separated workers used in the estimates
shown in Table 2. As suggested by the means in Table 1, the relationship
between the probabil ity of permanent layoff and wage change in the previous
year is much weaker than in the sample of displaced and other workers.
Indeed, while there is a negative relationship between mW —lnWrand the
probabil ity o-f permanent layoff, it is never significant at conventional
levels.
In Hamermesh 1984) I demonstrated a substantial flattening of
-15 -Table 3. Probit Analysis of the Probability of Permanent Layoff
(N =2725)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant —1.706 —1.455 .424 —.642
(—26.61) (—15.31) (.69) (—1.49)
ln(WT i)_ln(WT 2 —.265 —.215 —.340 —.213
(—1.02) (—.87) (—1.30) (—.77)













in L —721.24 —689.77 —678.24 —660.69
a The effect ofa unit increase in a particular variable on p is its coefficient estimate
times .0871.wage—tenure pro-files amongwor-kers who would later experience permanent
layoff,but no flatteninq among those whose plants would later close.I
interpreted this to mean that the probabil t>' of permanent layof-f becomes
clear to workers much earl ier be-fore the event occurs than does the
probabil it>' of displacement. Here one can interpret the difference in the
results between Tables 2 and 3 as reflecting the unwill ingness of workers in
plants where wage structures exist to accept wage cuts that at best will
reduce the probability of layoff for a few <Junior) workers, but will surely
reduce the wages received by all workers. On the other hand, workers seeing a
shock that increases the probability that the entire plant will close are
willing to accept a general reduction in wage growth that reduces in part the
increased risk that they will all lose their Jobs.
The supporting evidence provided by the coefficients on the terms in TN
in the probits for displacement is not observed in these probits. Increased
tenure does reduce the probabil it>' of permanent layoff; but there is no
quadratic effect of opposite sign.10 As in the weighted probits describing
displacement, the union status variable is insignificant; the dummy variable
for race, and the measure of school ing attainment too, have coefficients that
are significantly different from zero. However, these variables affect the
probabil ity of permanent layoff in directions that differ in all three cases
from what we predicted, but that support what evidence from other sets of data
leads one to expect: There is a higher probability of permanent layoff with
union status, among blacks and with lower educational attainment.11
V. Applications of the Estimates
The probit coefficients in Table 2 can be used in conJunction with the
derivationof <10') to examine two aspects of labor—market behavior. The
— 16 —general idea is to note that each point along the estimated probit represents
an equil ibrium of an indif-ference curve and a probabilistic shut—down frontier
and, under specific assumptions about the nature c-f these maps, infer
something more about their shapes and locations. The inferences rest on
approximations that hold only locally around the locus c-f equilibria; but in
that reQion the assumptions4 together with the notion of a probabilistic
shut—down frontier, able us to analyze labor—market behavior in ways not
heretofore possible.
A. Labor—Demand Elasticities
Throughout I assume that workers' indifference maps are homothetic around
the point c-f equil ibriurn.I assume that the map of probabil istic shut—down
frontiers is homothetic too, though I relax that assumption in some of the
calculations. The approach can be used to infer the typical firm's "demand
elasticity" for an individual worker. With both maps hornothetic the slope of
the shut—down frontier at a point on the equil ibrium locus is the inverse of
the slope of that locus. The resulting measure is not a standard total
labor—demand elasticity, since it does not relate employment levels to wage
levels. Rather, it is an analogue that can be made comparable to standard
estimates if we assume that the rate a-f change in the individual worker's
probabil it>' of employment induced by higher wages equals the expected
percentage dccl inc in the typical firm's demand for workers.
At the mean values of all the variables a fraction p c-f all workers will
be displaced in each time period if demand conditions in the typical firm are
indexed along the particular shut—dawn frontier 9*8*. An increase in lnW will
raise this fraction, so that in percentage terms the effect of a one—percent
increase in wages is
—17—p(p/.)nW)55.
Sincethe change ir iriWis the change along the horizontal axis in •a
version of Figure 1 that has w =mW — in on the horizontal axis, wecan
measure the slope of 5*3* as the inverse of the slope o-ftheEE locus.
If the probabil stir shut—down frontiers do not exhibit parallel shifts
as demand shocks occur the linear approximation to their slopes at the locus
of equilibria will be incorrect. Consider Figure 2a, which shows CD./AC, the
slope of the equil ibrium locus EE at a particular point A. The frontier
tangent to the indifference curve at A is 3*5*. As the particular example is
drawn, the inverse of the slope of EE' at A overstates the slope of 6*3*, for
EE' is becoming flatter as w increases. Thus the slope of 9*6*, BC/, should
be calculated as AC./CD rather than as AC/5'. To accomplish this I use a
second—order approximation to EE' and infer that:
[p/w}1 [1 —_______
AC
This modification corrects the estimate of the slope of 9* for the changing
slope of EE', a change that in turn is assumed to be produced by the possible
nonhomotheticity of the family of probabil istic shut-down frontiers.
The first row of Table 4 shows the first— and second—order approximations
to the slope of the probabilistic shut—down frontier at the sample means along
the equil ibrium locus of combinations of p and w. The calculations are based
on the estima!. weighted probits in column (4) of Table 2. Each figure shows
the percentage increase in the probability of the worker losing a Job because
of a plant closing in response to a one—percent increase in the wage rate,
holdin expected product—market conditions constant.
The estimates are well in line, or, in the case of the first—order
approximation, perhaps slightly higher than those produced in studies of
—18—p
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STable 4. Estimates of Parameters Derived from Table 2, Column (4)
First—Order Second—Order
Approxima tion Approximation
a. Labor—demand Elasticity —.86 —.37
b. Required wage concession, in percent —34.93 —34.97aggregated data for industries or entire economies. (See Hamermesh, 1986, for
!scussion of these estimates and some of the problems with them.) Since
these elasticities arebasedentirely on micro data, they are likely to be
larger than standard estimates: They reflect all changes in employment induced
by wage changes in a small unit, instead of netting out employment increases
in other firms and among other demographic groups that occur in an industry or
economy when a particular wage increases. That they are not much larger than
comr.i>-cited estimates indicates that the gross—net distinction is not
particularly vital. This suggests that using aggregate estimates to infer the
likely impacts of proposed changes in taxes on or subsidies to wages will not
create very large errors.
B. Response to Product—Market Shocks
The estimates of Section IV can also be used to infer the size of the
wage concession required to keep a plant's probabil ity of closing constant
when a negative demand shock occurs. In light of the recent interest in wage
concessions (see Mitchell, 1982>, these estimates should indicate the extent
of the concessions needed to prevent employment declines when product market
demand drops, and the willingness of workers to offer these concessions. As
such, they should be a more general set of evidence on the issue than that
provided by an examination of a few collective bargaining situations. More
important, they link wage concessions to employment protection, which is,
after all, their ostensible purpose.
Consider the schematic in Figure 2b, in which I assume a negative demand
shock has shifted the probabilistic shut—down frontier from 6*8* to S**S**. A
wage concession of A'D will be required if the probability of plant closing is
not to rise above what it was at A'. It will not be optimal for workers to
—19—p
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Soffer this large a concession, as D is not on the locus of equil ibria. I
calculate it in order to indicate what is needed, not what will occur. Assume
one knows the size of the increase in the probability of closing, BC, that
accompanies a move from A' to B. If both the equilibrium locus EE' and the new
zero—profit frontier S**8** were linear, I could calculate the required wage
decrease A'D=A'C+CD as [p/w] 1+p/w) times the change in the probabil ity
of displacement, BC, that would have otherwise occurred. While I cannot
adjust for the possible noni meant>' of S**S**, I can obtain a better measure
of the true distance 5by making the same second—order approximation used
before. In particular, the corrected decrease required to keep the
probability of displacement from rising by an amount BC is:
Tj5 = + = { + p/3W Li - PIaw2]}
Assuming that p would rise by .01 in response to a particular shock
(:.01), the estimates of the percentage change in wages required to return
the probabil it>' of displacement to its pre—shock level are shovn in the second
row of Table 4. The flatness of the equil ibnium locus guarantees that the
required wage cuts are quite large. Decreases of over 30 percent are required
to prevent the probability of plant closing from rising by one percentage
point when a negative shock occurs. (Of course, a one percentage—point rise
in this probability represents a 41.8 percent increase in the risk that the
plant closes.) The behavior impi icit in the estimated equil ibrium locus
perhaps explains why workers are loath to make wage concessions to "save
Jobs:" The required concessions are so large relative to the effect on the
probabil it>' of retaining employment that even risk—averse workers would rather
t-ake the increased probability of the plant closing than accept the certainty
of a substantial cut in pay. Given the shapes of util it>' functions and
probabil istic shut—down frontiers, it is socially optimal for workers to bear
—20—this increased risk rather than take larger pay cuts.13
Pay cuts of the magnitude needed to hold constant the probabil ity of
plant closing are not accepted because uncertainty about this probability
makes their acceptance an inferior solution from the worker's point of view.
However, the estimates in Table 2 clearly show that some wage cuts are
accepted in response to negative product—market shocks. This stands in sharp
contrast to the suggestion of Lawrence—Lawrence (1985) that, as part of
bargaining in the face of dccl ining demand, unions and firms will agree to
above—average wage increases. It may be true that such increases are observed
in isolated cases of declining product demand; our results show, though, that
they do not describe the responses of most firms and their employees.
VI. Conclusions
In this study I have developed a contracting approach to examining plant
closings. These are viewed as probabil istic events whose likelihood is
exogenously changed by variations in product demand, and is also affected by
workers' attitudes toward risk and by firms' technology. The exogenous shocks
interact with the taste and technology parameters to produce a locus of
equilibrium combinations of wage changes and probabilities of plant closings.
Because workers' tenure represents an asset that produces quasi—rents for the
firm (as well as quasi—rents for workers in the form of higher wages), changes
in workers' tenure affect the relation between wage changes and the
probabil ity of plant closing when a shock occurs.
This approach is examined using data -from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics, the only available longitudinal data set that distinguishes people
who have lost their jobs due to plant closings from those separated
involuntarily for other reasons. The estimates based on these data show the
—21—expected negative relation between wage chanqes and the probabil ityofplant
closing. Additional years of worker tenure are shown to reduce the
probabil ity of plant closing at a fixed rate of wage changes; and the marginal
reduction diminishes as tenure rises, implying the same quadratic shape to the
relationship between the quantity of firm—specific human capital and its
empirical proxy, tenure with the firm, as is implied by estimated wage—tenure
relations.
The results are used to calculate an analogue to a firm's labor—demand
elasticity. The estimates of the elasticity range from .35 to .9, roughly
consistent with results obtained by others using aggregated data. The results
on the determinants of the probability of plant closing also allow one to
infer that negative demand shocks would have to be met with wage increases far
below average if increases in the probability of shut—down are to be avoided.
This suggests one reason for workers' resistance to wage concessions in the
face of what often seems like a riskier labor market: Why accept the certainty
of a substantial wage cut in return for only a small reduction in the risk
that the plant will close?
If nothing else the estimates demonstrate clearly the simple empirical
fact that average wages grow less rapidly in plants that will soon closes I
use these results to support an underlying model of internal labor markets in
which firms and the workers tied to them respond to exogenous shocks by
accepting wage changes and a new probability of plant shut—down. To refine
the approach and link the estimates still more closely to the underlying
model, one needs data that allow the inference of specific forms of the
underlying utility functions and probabil istic shut—down frontiers, thus
obviating the need to make the assumptions required here. Data linking firii.
and workers are needed to permit better estimates to be drawn. Longitudinal
—data are also needed on larger sanples of displaced workers: While the
estimates provided here are Qenerally significant, they are not always so, a
failing that may result from the small sample of displaced workers in the
total PS1D
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—25—FOOTNOTES
1.Wall Street Journal ,October13, 1982, pag 1.
2. See Congressional Budget Office (1982:> for a discussion of the magnitude of
the plant—closing problem; Harnerrnesh (1984:) for an analysis of its social
costs and Mitchell <1982) for a discussion o-fthegrowth of wage concessions
in union contracts.
3. While this relationship has not heretofore been tested, the argument is,of
course, the same as that of Rosen (1974) and has been applied to estimating
the relationship between wage rates and various Job—related risks.
4. Differentiating in (6), one sees that:
2 2 d p/dW =(1—p) (UU —U•') /U < 0,
under standard assumptions.
5. This transformation is made to scale the wage measure to au nt for the
heterogeneity of general training among workers as they enter the firm.
6. The size of the adjustment is based on standard wage equations estimated
over the entire sample for year T—1 and including the usual array of
demographic variables, industry dummy variables, education, total experience
and its square, and years of tenure and its square. Because the observations
come from different years, wage rates are made comparable across calendar time
by inflating using the growth in private nonfarm hourly earnings between the
time each W is observed and 1980.
7. While 59 percent of displaced workers have five or fewer years' tenure at
time T—1, 25 percent had more than ten years' tenure with their employer at
that time.
8. Only 8 percent have more than ten years' tenure with their employer.
9. The results on this measure, on lnW —lnWr'and on the tenure variables
differ only slightly when mt/is defined as lflWT2, unadjusted for differences
in tenu.
10. Though the individual terms in TN in the probit in columns (2)—(4) are not
highly significant, p/TN is significantly negative, as the existence of
rules requiring layoffs by inverse seniority suggests will be the case.
11. See Blau—Kahn (1981) for evidence on layoffs using data on young men and
women from the NLS.
12. The correction is equivalent to a Maclaurin—series approximation to the
equil ibrium locus, as DavidHarnermeshhas pointed out.
13. One union leader rioted, "But, worker concessions won't save our jobs,
revive our industries or help the economy." (Tony Mazzocchi
,OCAWDistrict 8,
in Worker's Policy Project, 1t' Time for Management Concessions. New York
1983.
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